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Murky Waters: The Supreme Court's Decision on Navigability
and it's Implications on Judicial Power
PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana'
I. INTRODUCTION

Determining whether or not a river is navigable sounds like it
should be a straightforward question, one that hardly seems worthy of
consideration by the Supreme Court. However, that is exactly what the
Court was tasked to consider in a recent decision in terms of how
navigability applies to riverbed title. 2 The Court held that the test for
navigability with regards to riverbed title should be on a segment-bysegment basis, which seems self-explanatory on its surface. 3 However,
the Court's reasoning goes beyond just solidifying the proper analysis for
riverbed title. By including extensive research that was absent in the
record, and by remanding back to a state supreme court with only one
possible outcome, the Court deviated from its normal handlings of state
supreme court appeals and made an outlier decision that has the potential
of becoming a controversial trend.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

The controversy in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana arose over a
dispute as to who owned sections of riverbeds on three rivers in Montana:
the Upper Missouri, Madison, and Clark Folk Rivers.4 PPL, a limited
liability power company based in Delaware, owns ten facilities on these
rivers, all of which have been at their current locations for many years,
some for over a century. 5 The dams on the Upper Missouri and the
Madison are called the Missouri-Madison project, and the facility on the

' 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
2 Id at 1222.
' Id at 1230.
4 Id at 1222.
- Id at 1225.
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Clark Folk facility is called the Thompson Falls project.6 All the facilities
serve Montana residents and businesses.7
The Court goes through a rather extensive breakdown of the
histories of these three rivers, citing many materials that were not included
in the record or any of the briefs submitted to the Court. 8 Among the
additional materials the Court references are multiple journals, letter, and
diaries of Lewis and Clark as well as other historical sources which detail
Montana's history.9 Justice Kennedy breaks down the topography of each
river in what he calls "somewhat more detail."' 0 His first and most indepth analysis goes into the history and topography of the Missouri River,
detailing how it has "shifted and flooded often" and "contained many
sandbars, islands, and unstable banks."" His historical research goes back
to a newspaper from 1868, which he cites as describing the Missouri as
"one of the most variable beings in creation" and as "inconstant [as] the
action of the jury."1 2 He also relies extensively on the journals of Lewis
and Clark, pointing to Lewis' descriptions of many rocky and rapid-filled
segments of the river.1 3 He cites to one specific passage where Lewis
describes the Great Falls segment of the river as "a constant succession of
rapids and falls," in which buffalo "were swept over the cataracts in
considerable quantities and were instantly crushed."' 4 Justice Kennedy
then turns his attention to the Madison River, noting how it was named
such by Lewis and Clark for former Secretary of State James Madison.' 5
He notes how the river flows west out of the Rocky Mountains and then
6 Id. Both

projects are licenses by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
and were
acquired by PPL from its predecessor, the Montana Power Company Id
Id
S-id.at 1222-25.

9 id.

0 id.at 1222.
" Id
12 Id (alteration in original)(internal quotations omitted).

" Id at 1223-24.
14 Id
15

at 1224.

d
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joins in Three Forks, Montana to form "the Upper Missouri."' 6 Finally, he
breaks down the Clark Fold River, describing it as "one of the wildest and
most picturesque streams in the West, marked by many waterfalls and
boxed gorges."' 7 Justice Kennedy cites back to the Lewis and Clark
journals, noting that they did not actually try to navigate the river because
the lack of salmon made "Lewis believe there must be a considerable fall,"
which it turns out he was right about.' 8 Kennedy introduced much of this
background information through his independent research; very little of it
was included in briefs or oral arguments submitted by the parties.' 9
Before this case, the State of Montana had never sought
compensation for use of the riverbeds, and PPL paid rent to the United
States. 20 The State of Montana was well aware of the facilities' existence,
and many state agencies had even participated in the federal licensing
proceedings for the facilities. 2 1 The State never sought any compensation
and PPL and its predecessor never paid any compensation for the ongoing
use of the riverbeds. 22

16 id
17Id (quoting FED. WRITERS' PROJECTS OF THE WORKS PROGRESS ADMIN., IDAHO: A
GUIDE IN WORD AND PICTURE 230 (2d ed. 1950)) (internal quotations omitted).
'8 Id (quoting H. FRrrz, THE LEWIS AND CLARK EXPEDITION 38-39 (2004)) (internal

omitted).
uotations
While there is some reference to the Lewis and Clark Journals in the respondent's brief,
Kennedy cites to sections not referenced, as well as several encyclopedias and travel
guides found nowhere in the record submitted to the Court. Conpare id at 1222-25
(citing authorities not in the record with respect to the history of the three rivers), wth
Brief for Respondent at 8-15, PPL Montana, v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10218),(2011 WL 5136226) at *8-15 (discussing limited reliance onjournals and other
historical materials as authority), and Transcript for Oral Argument, PPL Montana v.
Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218), 2011 WL 6077583 (stating no reference
to the authorities the Court cites for historical background).
20 PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1225.
21
22

Id
Id
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JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW

VOL. 20, No. 1

But, in 2003, parents of schoolchildren brought suit against PPL in
the United States District Court for the District of Montana, alleging that
the riverbeds underneath the facilities were state owned and part of the
school trust lands. 23 The State later joined the suit, seeking compensation
for unpaid rent for the first time, but the suit was dismissed for lack of
diversity jurisdiction.24 In response, PPL and two other power companies
sued the State of Montana in the First Judicial District Court of Montana,
seeking a declaratory judgment against the State in an attempt to bar the
State from seeking compensation for the use of the specific riverbeds in
question. 25 The State counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that it owned
the riverbeds under the equal-footing doctrine, and therefore is entitled to
rent for their previous and continued use by PPL.2 6
The First Judicial District Court of Montana granted summary
judgment for Montana as to navigability for purposes of determining title,
deciding that Montana owned the riverbeds.
The court ordered PPL to
pay the State $40,956,180 in rent for using the riverbeds between 2000
and 2007.28

On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court, in a divided decision,
affirmed the trial court's decision.2 9 The court applied a liberal
interpretation of the navigability test and found that while certain stretches
of the rivers were not navigable and required overland portageo, these
23 1d
24
25

/d

Said The 10 PPL facilities are distributed as follows on the three
rivers: the Upper

Missouri River (7 dams), the Madison River (2 dams), and the Clark Folk River (1
facility).
Id
26

d

Id at 1225-26.
28 Id at 1226. Any lease for future periods and any
potential rate was apparently left up to
discretion of Montana Board of Land Commissioners. Id
29 /d
30
Portage is defined as "the carrying of boats or goods overland from one body of water
to another or around an obstacle (as a rapids)." Portage Deinition, MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/portage.
27
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were just short interruptions insufficient to find non-navigability as a
matter of law. 3 1 The court held that attempting to assess navigability of
the particular segment of the river, rather than the river as a whole, had
"limited applicability." 32 The court extensively relied upon evidence of
present-day use of the Madison River and found that it was navigable as a
matter of law at the time of statehood.33 In his dissent, Justice Rice stated
that the majority erred in not applying the "section-by-section" approach
to determining navigability, and also erred in rejecting PPL's evidence
that showed the sections of the rivers in questions were "at the time of
statehood, non-navigable." 34
In its petition for certiorari, PPL argued there were contested issues
of material fact undermining nearly all of the Montana Supreme Court's
findings, relying on Justice Rice's dissent for much of its support. 35 PPL
did not seek summary judgment for itself; it only contended that the
Montana Supreme Court's grant of summary judgment for the State was
improper due to genuine issues of material fact. 36
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed and remanded
the case for further proceedings. 3 7 In an opinion written by Justice
Kennedy the majority held: (1) the navigability test under the equal
footing doctrine should be applied considering rivers on a segment-by-

31PPL,

32

33

d

132 S.Ct. at 1226.

d

34 /d
3 SqegenerallyPetitionfor Writ of Cert. At 16-38, PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S. Ct.

1215 (2012) (No. 10-218), (2011 WL 3236721), at *17-38 (arguing that the Montana
Supreme Court decision ignores established navigability precedent and principles of
federalism).
36

eid at 17-18.

3 PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1226, 1235.
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segment basis; (2) the analysis of navigability should be at time of
statehood; and (3) the Great Falls Reach was not navigable.3 8
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

Several legal principles control the outcome of this case, beginning
with the navigability doctrine. 3 9 English common law established that
States as sovereigns, hold title to riverbeds under navigable waters.4 0
English law distinguished between tidal waters, which were considered
royal rivers and nontidal waters, which were considered public
highways. 4 1 The Crown held title to the riverbeds of roial rivers, but the
public retained the right of passage and of fishing.
As for public
highways, the public had the same right of passage, but the title to the
riverbeds was generally privately owned.4 3 American law adopted this
common law rule for riverbed title, but later developed a rule of
"navigability in fact." 44 States therefore held title to factually navigable
waters within their borders.4 5
The state riverbed title rule assumed constitutional significance
under the equal-footing doctrine.4 6 The Court declared in Martin v. Lese
of Waddedl that for the original thirteen states, all the people of each
individual state "hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and
the soils under them" based on principles of sovereignty.4 7 The Court
expanded this principle to all states later admitted to the Union as all states

3
39
40

41
42

Id. at 1229, 1232, 1233.

%eidat 1226-29.

Id. at 1226.
Id

d

Id at 1226-27.
' Id at 1227.

43

45
/d
451d.

46Id
47

Id (quoting Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842)). These rights were
subject to powers granted and rights surrendered by the Constitution. Id
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are coequal sovereigns under the Constitution. 48 This precedent is the
foundation for the equal-footing doctrine, under which the state's title is
not granted "by Congress but by the Constitution itself."49 The equalfooting doctrine applies to a title so that, upon statehood, a State gains title
to beds of waters then navigable within its borders.50 Thus, the United
States retains title to any non-navigable waters and can transfer or license
those waters at its discretion. 5 '
The Court laid out the navigability test in The Danid Ball, a case
that addressed federal power in regulating navigation. 52 In setting up a
new rule for determining navigability, the Court held that if a river is
"navigable in fact" then it must be regarded as a public navigable river. 53
The Court defined "navigable in fact" as any river that is or can be used as
"a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on ... in

the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water." 54
United Sates v. Utah applied these foundational principles and laid

out the rest of the legal principles in the case at hand.55 In Utah, the
United States brought suit against the state of Utah in order to quiet title to
certain portions of the Colorado River.56 The U.S. claimed that the rivers
were not navigable for purposes of determining title and that Utah was
executing numerous leases granting rights and privileges that it did not
have.5 7 Utah attempted to show that the waters were in fact navigable and

PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1227.
49 Id (citing Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
374 (1977)).
so
51 PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1227-28.
Id. at 1228 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 63, 75 (1931)).
52 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871); SalsoPPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1228.
5 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563; SalsoPPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1228.
54 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
ss %generallyUnited States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
48

56 Sid
57

at 71.
Id at 71-72.
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that the State therefore was granted title upon admission to the Union.
The Court referred to the navigability test established in The Danie Ball,
but pointed out that "the controversy relates only to the sections of the
rivers which are described in the complaint." 59 The Court said that even in
a generally navigable river, it must be determined "how far navigability
extends" and that "the exact point at which navigability may be deemed to
end ... should be determined precisely." 60 The Court also emphasized that

the question of navigability is assessed as of the time of statehood. 6 1
Applying these principles, the Court determined that the Colorado River
was navigable for roughly its first 4 miles, non-navigable for roughly the
next 36 miles, and then navigable for its remaining 149 miles. 62
Another legal principle that bears discussion is the Court's
extensive review of evidence included in and outside of the record.63
Through the doctrine of judicial notice, the Court may make findings,
either on its own or upon the motion of either party, of any adjudicative
fact that is "not subject to reasonable dispute" because it either: "(1) is
generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can
be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
be reasonably questioned."64 This rule concerns only "adjudicative facts"
and not "legislative facts." 65 Black's Law Dictionary defines an
"adjudicative fact" as "a controlling or operative fact, rather than a
background fact; a fact that concerns the parties to a judicial or
administrative proceeding and that helps the court or agency determine
how the law applies to those parties." 6 Put more simply, adjudicative
Id at 76-77.
' Id. at 77, 90.
58

6o
61

id at 90.
Id. at 75.

62

PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1229 (2012) (citing United States v.
Utah, 238 U.S. 64, 73-74, 79-81, 89 (1931)).
61 S
ag., id. at 1222-25.
645 Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2).
6

Fn

6FACT,

Black's Law Dictionary 275 (9th ed. 2009).
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facts are "simply the facts of the particular case." 67

Generally,

adjudicative facts are established through the introduction of evidence

from witness testimony and document submission.6 8 If certain facts are
seen as virtually indisputable, the process of introducing the evidence can
be "dispensed with as unnecessary," although a "high degree of
indisputability is the essential prerequisite." 69
The Court's treatment of a State Supreme Court decision is the last
issue that bears discussion. 70 The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a
decision of a state supreme court upon issues of the constitutionality of
state statutes, or as in this case, upon issues where "any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution."7 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
granting of summary judgment, which requires "no genuine dispute as to
any material fact" which entitles the movant to "judgment as a matter of
law." 72 To create a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party
must "set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact
at trial."7 Upon review, the Supreme Court must determine whether the
non-movant has presented "affirmative evidence in order to defeat a
properly supported motion for summary judgment." 74

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the
Montana Supreme Court. 75 The Court had to determine whether the
67 Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) advisory committee's note.
68

Id

69

Id

PPL Montana, LLC. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012).
7' 28 U.S.C. 1257(a) (2013).
72 PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1219; Mont. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
7 Mont. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
74 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
7 PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1226.
70
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Montana Supreme Court correctly applied the navigability test to the river
*76
segments in question.
The Court analyzed the Montana Supreme Court's application of
the equal footing doctrine, the navigability test, and the issue of evidence
of present-day use to the case at hand, ultimately finding the Montana
Supreme Court used an incorrect interpretation of the equal-footing
doctrine.7 7 The Court said that when determining riverbed title, the river
is to be considered on a segment-by-segment basis, not as a whole as the
Montana Supreme Court did. 8 The Court cited cases that established this
as precedent. 79 It explained that sovereign ownership of navigable
riverbeds keeps private owners from altering the riverbeds in order to
interfere with the public's right to use the waters as highways for
commerce.8 0 Giving States title to navigable riverbeds reduces the
possibility of a conflict between private and public interests.
Because
segments of rivers that were non-navigable at the time of statehood do not
allow for commerce, there is no reason for States to hold title to those
segments under the equal-footing doctrine. 82 The Court also pointed to
practical reasons for the segment approach, such as the varying physical
conditions of long rivers, such as the Missouri, which runs over 2,000
miles including "mountains, canyons, waterfalls, rapids, and sandy
plains."83
The Court also found error in the Montana Supreme Court's
holding that necessity of portage does not undermine navigability. 84 The
Court says that the Montana Supreme Court incorrectly relied on the
7
7
78
7

Id. at 1219.
Id at 1229.
Id at 1229-1230.
Id eUnited States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 77 (1931), Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v.

United States, 260 U.S. 77, 85 (1922).
80 PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1230.
81Id
82 d
83 Id

' /d at 123 1.
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Court's decision in The Montaflo, which pertained to navigability for
purposes of determining whether the Federal Government could regulate
boats upon the waters, not for purposes of determining title." In fact, the
Court found that portage demonstrates the need to bypass a particular
stretch of river because it is then actually non-navigable in fact.8 6 The
Court applied the proper rule to the Great Falls stretch, which the Montana
Supreme Court found navigable, and found that the necessity of portage
defeated navigability for title purposes in relation to that stretch.87 The
Court went on to say that there was a significant likelihood that some of
the other stretches fail the navigability test for the purpose of determining
title. 8 The Court did not go so far as to actually determine navigability
for the remaining segments, but indicated that upon remand, the lower
courts should assess the relevant evidence in light of the above-mentioned
principles. 89 The Court again points out that the varying conditions allow
for an easier means in determining the beginning and ending points of
navigability. 90
The Court found that the Montana Supreme Court further erred in
relying on present-day recreational use of the Madison River.9 ' The Court
clarified that such evidence may be considered, but only insofar as
showing that the river in question could sustain the kinds of commercial
use that may have occurred at the time of statehood. 92 The Court
explained that navigability must be assessed at the time of statehood, and
concerns the rivers usefulness for trade and travel, not other purposes.9 3

85 Id
8

6 Id

87 Id at 1232.
88

Id
Id at 1233
90 Id at 1230.
9' Id at 1233.
89

92

93

d

Id
140
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Because of the several misinterpretations regarding the equalfooting doctrine, the segment-by-segment test for navigability, and the
reliance on present day recreational use, the Court held that the Montana
Supreme Court's decision should be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with their opinion. 94
V. COMMENT
The Court's decision in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana has
several interesting aspects worthy of discussion.
The holding's
clarification of precedent on the finding of navigability for riverbed title
purposes goes a long way towards solidifying property rights in the future
with factually similar cases, as well as clearing up what the specific
navigability test should be depending on the inquiry at issue. But, far
more controversial is the process the Court used to arrive at its holding by
performing extensive research which was not included in the record. The
Court seems to have overstepped its judicial notice rights by using
evidence not offered to it as a means to reach the holding it desired. The
Court also set a dangerous precedent by actually making a determination
of the navigability of the Great Falls stretch. While this is apparently the
correct holding, the fact that the Court made the holding itself takes away
any discretion of the Montana Supreme Court to make its own holding and
can lead to an improper broadening of the highest court's powers.
A. The Court's Distinctionon PrecedentandIts Affect on

Property Diqoutes and Public Access
In making its decision in PPL Montana, the Court made sure to
clarify the distinctions between the holdings in United Sates v. Utah and
The Montdlo. The Court emphasizes that the holding in Utah is the rule
to follow, and that The Montdlo applies to a completely different type of
inquiry all together. 95 The distinction comes down to the difference
between an inquiry into navigability for purposes of determining title to
Id. at 1235.
s Id at 1230-32.

9
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riverbeds, and an inquiry into determining whether the federal government
can regulate boats upon a specific body of water. The Court correctly held
that the proper test for determining navigability in regards to title was
demonstrated in Utah, and that the Montana Supreme Court simply
misapplied the rule. 96
The segment approach to determining navigability is the better
approach for several reasons. Primarily, by only giving States the rights to
specific segments of waters that were navigable at the time of statehood,
the Court is able to insure that private owners are not building obstructions
or improvements which block the public's right to use those waters as
highways for commerce. States are able to make sure that navigable
waters remain that way, but the states are not given more land rights than
they originally had at the time of statehood. The Court did a good job in
balancing the many factors at play, from states' rights to the public's right
to usage of public waters, while still sticking to precedent and weeding out
any potential legal loopholes for the contestation of riverbed title rights in
the future.
The Court's clarification of the rule from The Montdlo also
cleared up any issues on the impact of portage in an analysis of
navigability. 97 In The Montdlo, the Court was determining whether the
Colorado River was a "navigable water of the United States" for purposes
of determining whether boats upon it could be regulated by the federal
government. 98 In that case, the Court correctly concluded that the
necessity of portage did not defeat a finding of navigability because the
necessity of portage does not preclude a river from being "part of a
channel of interstate commerce." 99 By contrast, when analyzing segments
of a river's navigability for title purposes, the test is whether the segment
Id at 1230.
97 Id at 1231.
98 Id.
96

9 Id at 1232.
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of the river is navigable in fact.' 00 By definition, if the segment of the
river requires portage, then it is not navigable in fact.' 0 '
This distinction is important for a few reasons. First, it keeps
consistency with prior rulings on the issue of title of riverbeds, a
consideration that is important to property owners. It would be unwise for
the Court to change an established property rule upon which people have
relied. The Court does not want to unintentionally cause heaps of
litigation because it changed centuries old precedent about who holds title
to certain types of riverbeds. Second, by reestablishing precedent, the
Court keeps states from attempting to gain title to lands they did not
originally have title to upon admission to the Union. While States must
retain their powers as sovereigns, checks upon their power are equally
important.
This aspect of the Court's holding, while not very
controversial, is still important as it clears up many of the previously
confused legal principles in determining which navigability test should be
used in which situation - navigability for purposes of determining riverbed
title versus purposes of determining whether the federal government can
regulate boats upon the waters in question.
B. The Court'sApproach to Evidence Not Induded in the

Recordor Briefs
An interesting aspect of the Court's approach to deciding this case
comes in its analysis of many materials not included in the record. Justice
Kennedy goes into the extensive history of all the rivers in question, and
uses seemingly obscure materials such as the journals and letters of Lewis
and Clark from their expedition west early in the history of the United
State.10 2 Generally, in determining whether federal issues were properly
decided in a case, the Supreme Court will stick to the record in an attempt
to apply the law correctly to the case it has decided to adjudicate.' 03 The
' Id
1o1 Id
102
0
13

Id at 1222-25.

Thomas W. Merrill, Opinion Analyds Montana Dunke on Rverbeag
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Court is ordinarily only supposed to correct misapplication of federal law
by lower courts, but here the Court performed independent research,
submitting what it found to be "adjudicative facts" which were not
included in the record by submission from either party. 104 The doctrine of
judicial notice allows the Court to, on its own, make findings of
adjudicative facts. 0 5 However, Justice Kennedy uses this power to the
limit, instituting facts into the record without which the Court's holding
probably would not have the same solid foundation.' 0 6 Much of the
evidence offered in the briefs and oral arguments would probably have
pointed to a finding of non-navigability, especially for the Great Falls
stretch, even without the additional materials cited by Justice Kennedy.
The implications of the Court's independent research in PLL Montana set
a dangerous precedent for future cases when the Court uses its discretion
to introduce new evidence through the doctrine of judicial notice.
There are several types of cases where this kind of additional
research by the Court would not only be improper, but could completely
turn the outcome of the case in the opposite direction it would have
originally been found. This additional research by the judges could
sometimes simply be to better acquaint themselves with the subjects upon
which they are tasked to rule. Because judges are normal people prone to
biases and opinions, such research could lead them to believe a case
should be decided a certain way, and they may use judicial notice as a
means to introduce hand-picked facts into the case which will sway the
decision in one way or the other.
Kenneth Culp Davis goes into some examples of these dangers.

07

In Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, Justice Brandeis went far outside the
SCOTUSBLOGI (Feb. 23, 2012, 11:03 AM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/opinion-analysis-montana-dunked-on-riverbeds.
"4 Id; Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)-(b).

"os Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)-(b).

106%egenerallyPPL,132 S.Ct. at 1222-32.
107Kenneth

Culp Davis, An Approach to Probles of Evdence in the Adinistrative
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record in an attempt to better learn "the art of break-making and the
usages of the trade."' 0 8 In his opinion, Justice Brandeis references
numerous "books, articles, reports of committees, testimony before
congressional committees ... all in utter disregard of any rules of evidence

that would control adjudicative facts."' 09 The requirement behind the use
of judicial notice for adjudicative facts is that the fact "is not subject to
reasonable dispute" because "it is generally known within the trial court's
jurisdiction; or can be accurately and readily determined from sources
whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.""l0 Davis has a real
problem with this, and many other previous uses of the judicial notice
doctrine."' He points out, and it is hard not to agree, that the "intricacies
of bread-making" are hardly generally-known within any kind of
jurisdiction, and that "the accuracy of the sources - books, articles,
reports, letters, testimony - is anything but indisputable."ll 2 Davis further
explains what a slippery slope conducting this extensive independent
research can be for judges." 3 He believes that "judge-made law would
stop growing if judges ... were forbidden to take into account the facts
they believe, as distinguished from facts which are clearly within the
domain of the indisputable.""14
The same kind of conceris can easily be applied to the case at
hand. Just like the "intricacies of bread-making" are not generally known
facts, neither is the topography of any of the rivers in question, much less
its topography at the time of statehood. Now, much of what Justice
Kennedy introduces into the record could arguably be considered to be
Procss 55 HARv. L. REV. 364, 403-407 (1942).
9 Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 520 (1924).
109 Davis, supra note 107, at 404.
"o Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)-(b).

11 Davis, supranote 107, at 404-406.
112 Id at
405.
" Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) advisory committee's note (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, A

S1ster of Judidal Notice Basi on Fairnes and Conveiimoe in PERSPECTIVES OF
LAW 69, 82 (1964)).
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"from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned."' 15
Justice Kennedy cited Lewis and Clark journals, several encyclopedias,
different newspapers and historical guidebooks in his discussion of the
topography of each river.11 6 However, this is a dangerous precedent to set,
especially with the use of the Lewis and Clark's journals and letters.
Where are justices to draw the line when it comes to use of judicial notice
with journals or letters of other historical figures, especially those with
less significance than Lewis and Clark? By incorporating all of this
independent research on his own, Justice Kennedy has made it possible for
judges at all levels to feel they have more discretion than they do (or
should) in terms of conducting their own factual research on materials not
included in the record. There are many types of cases where this could
present a real problem. Following this logic, judges could begin looking
for their own experts in criminal cases; they could attempt to obtain
medical records on their own in negligence or liability cases; or they
could, like Justice Brandeis did, conduct research on the plight of a
particular profession of people. This type of proceeding could possibly
lead to the judges' viewpoints on the matter being introduced into the
record as adjudicative facts through judicial notice. The Court must be
careful how it goes from here so that it does not overstep its bounds
further in terms of the judicial notice doctrine.
C. The Court's Unique Approach to an Appealfrom a State

Court Decision wth Regards to Questions of Federal Law
Another noteworthy aspect of this case is the way the Court
departs from the general procedure in determining whether the decision of
a state supreme court was correct.11 7 On granting a writ of certiorari from
a state supreme court, the Supreme Court only needs to determine whether
there were genuine issues of material fact which precluded summary

us PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1222-25; Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
116 PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1222-25; Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
"' PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1231-33.
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judgment for the State of Montana as a matter of law.11 Here, by holding
that the Great Falls reach is not navigable for purposes of riverbed title' ,
the Court all but determines what the Montana Supreme Court's decision
must be upon remand. The Court even tells the Montana Supreme Court
that in addition to the Great Falls reach being not navigable, "there is a
significant likelihood that some of the other river stretches in dispute also
fail the federal test of navigability for purposes of determining title." 20 In
essence, the Court treats the case as if it was an appeal from a lower
federal court by applying its decisions on matters of law to the facts in the
case, instead of simply correcting errors of federal law and then remanding
for the state courts to apply them as it normally would.121 By basically
dictating what the Montana Supreme Court must do upon remand, the
Supreme Court deviates from well-established precedent and goes beyond
its discretion. This is another potentially slippery slope upon which the
Court has embarked, leaving open the question of how it will deal with
state supreme court decisions in the future. If this is the beginning of a
new trend in dealing with state courts, Justice Kennedy may have opened
the Court up to a great deal of criticism on the infringement of rights of
the state courts. The Supreme Court is able to review the decisions of the
highest state courts in order to ensure that the lower courts do not infringe
upon privileges and rights guaranteed by the Constitution.122 State courts
are left to apply the corrected federal law as they see fit, giving them some
sense of sovereignty as guaranteed by the Constitution under the equalfooting doctrine.
If the Supreme Court is going to begin simply making
decisions for the state courts, it will likely open itself up to a strong

backlash and possible litigation from the states claiming that their
Constitutional rights have been infringed. The Court must tread carefully
moving forward to ensure it does not overstep its bounds in terms of
review of state supreme court decisions upon the granting of certiorari.
..
sFed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
119 PPL, 132 S. Ct. at 1232.
120 /d
121Merrill,
122

spra note 103.
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

123PPL,

132 S. Ct. at 1227.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in PPL cleared up confusion
regarding precedent in property rights disputes for riverbed title. By
affirming and clarifying the established precedent, the Court ensured that
States' property rights were not infringed upon, and that members of the
public (who have had property ownership stakes for centuries) were not
suddenly deprived of property ownership stakes to which they were
entitled. The segment-by-segment approach to determining navigability
also ensures that waters, which should remain open for public use will not
be unnecessarily obstructed and that those waters remain open as
highways for commerce. But the Court has overstepped its bounds by
abusing the judicial notice doctrine and introducing evidence from outside
the record that Justice Kennedy hand-selected (in consideration of no rules
regarding the introduction of evidence) in order to build a better
foundation for the holding he saw as best. The Supreme Court justices
must be more diligent in sticking to the record and resisting the temptation
to bend the rules of procedure and evidence simply so they can solidify
they holding they want to issue. The Court also must be to avoid holdings
it is not required, and possibly not allowed, to make. By finding the Great
Falls reach non-navigable and telling the Montana Supreme Court that
other stretches of the rivers in question are likely not navigable either, the
Court overstepped its bounds and made a ruling for the state, instead of
simply remanding for proper application of the clarified federal rules. The
Court is at a significant point in its history and does not need to do
anything further to make the public and especially the states question
whether its authority is being used properly and within the confines of the
Constitution.
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